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THE BEST CANDIDATE: PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION IN POLARIZED TIMES 
(Eugene D. Mazo and Michael R. Dimino, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 
2020) 
Abstract 
The Constitution says nothing about the presidential nominating process and has had little 
direct role in its evolution from congressional caucuses to party national conventions to our current 
primary-dominated system. Yet, constitutional law is a factor in empowering and constraining the 
principal actors in the nomination process and in shaping the framework for potential future 
changes.  
The constitutional law of the presidential nomination process operates along two axes: 
government-party, and state-national.  The government-party dimension focuses on the tension 
between the states and the federal government in writing the rules for and administering the 
electoral process -- which may include the primary elections that determine the nominees of the 
political parties – and the right of the parties to determine how to pick their nominees. Doctrinally, 
this involves Supreme Court’s efforts to reconcile the power of the states to write the rules for 
state-run elections, including the primary elections that decide party nominations, with the 
freedom of political association guaranteed to the parties under the First Amendment. 
 This government-party axis affects all nominations for state and federal office. 
Presidential nominations, however, are distinct. For most elections, federal as well as state, most 
of the rules are determined by state law. But presidential nominations involve a national-level 
party decision for a nation-wide office. As a result, national party rules and federal laws factor into 
shaping the nomination process and add the possibility of conflicts between national- and state-
level rules to the more common government-party tensions. Key Supreme Court rulings have held 
that national party rules and the decisions of the national party conventions take precedence over 
conflicting state laws and state party decisions. To date, Congress has played a minimal role in 
this area, and its authority to regulate the nomination process has been contested, but its powers 
need to be understood if Congress is to be involved in reforming this process. 
 The chapter concludes by suggesting that although the multiplicity of constitutionally-
empowered actors may be – and has been – a source of conflict and complexity in the presidential 
nomination process, it may also be a strength. By permitting so many avenues for change, the 
constitutional framework creates multiple openings for reform. 
 
 
                                                          
* Richard Briffault is Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation at Columbia Law School. 




 The Constitution says nothing about the presidential nominating process and has 
had little direct role in the evolution of that process from congressional caucuses to party 
national conventions to our current primary-dominated system of selecting convention 
delegates.1 Yet, constitutional law is a factor in empowering and constraining the principal 
actors in the nomination process and in shaping the framework for potential future 
changes.  
 The constitutional law of the presidential nomination process operates along two 
axes: government-party, and state-national.  The government-party dimension focuses 
on the tension between the states and the federal government in writing the rules for and 
administering the electoral process -- which may include the primary elections that 
determine the nominees of the political parties – and the right of the parties to determine 
how to pick their nominees. This government-party axis affects all nominations of 
candidates for state and federal office. Presidential nominations, however, are distinct. 
For most elections, federal as well as state, most of the rules are determined by state law. 
But presidential nominations involve a national-level party decision for a nation-wide 
office. As a result, national party rules and federal laws factor into shaping the nomination 
process and add the possibility of conflicts between national- and state-level rules to the 
more common government-party tensions.  
This chapter reviews the constitutional context for the presidential nomination 
process and its implication for reforms. Part II considers the government-party axis, and 
especially the Supreme Court’s efforts to reconcile the power of state governments to 
write the rules for state-run elections, including the primary elections that decide party 
nominations, with the freedom of political association guaranteed to the parties under the 
First Amendment.2  
                                                          
1 On the evolution of the presidential nomination process, see generally Stephen Gardbaum & Richard H. Pildes, 
Populism and Institutional Design: Methods of Selecting Candidates for Chief Executive, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 647, 
652‒66 (2018). 
2 Technically, in cases dealing with state law, the courts are applying the First Amendment as incorporated into the 
Fourteenth Amendment. For the sake of simplicity, this chapter will refer to these as First Amendment cases. 
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 Part III add national concerns to the mix. It examines the key Supreme Court 
rulings holding that national party rules and the decisions of the national party conventions 
take precedence over conflicting state laws and state party decisions. Part IV completes 
the treatment of the state-national dimension by considering the power of Congress to 
regulate the presidential nominating process. To date, Congress has played a minimal 
role in this area, and its authority to regulate the nomination process has been contested, 
but its powers are important to understand if Congress is to be involved in reforming this 
process. 
 Part V concludes by suggesting that although the multiplicity of constitutionally-
empowered actors may be – and has been – a source of conflict and complexity in the 
presidential nomination process, it may also be a strength. By permitting so many 
avenues for change, the constitutional framework creates multiple openings for reform. 
II. The Political Parties, Party Nominations, and the States 
 The Constitution says nothing about political parties. Indeed, as Madison’s 
concerns in Federalist No. 10 about “the mischiefs of faction”3 and Washington’s 
denunciation in his Farewell Address of the “common and continual mischiefs of the spirit 
of party”4 both suggest, the Framers were hostile to political parties. Nonetheless, political 
parties quickly emerged, and they played a crucial role in presidential elections as early 
as 1800. By the late nineteenth century, our political process was thoroughly dominated 
by organized political parties. As private organizations, these political parties initially 
operated outside the scope of legal regulation. That began to change in the closing 
decades of the nineteenth century with the adoption of official state ballots.  
A. State Regulation of the Party Nomination Process 
 At one time, it was common for the parties to print their own ballots and then try to 
persuade voters to take the party’s ballot into the polls. As the Supreme Court put it, 
“[a]pproaching the polling place under this system was akin to entering an open auction 
place. As the elector started his journey to the polls, he was met by various party ticket 
                                                          
3 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed10.asp.  
4 Transcript of President George Washington’s Farewell Address, OURDOCUMENTS.GOV (Sept. 17, 1796), 
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=15&page=transcript.  
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peddlers ‘who were only too anxious to supply him with their party tickets.’ Often the 
competition became heated when several such peddlers found an uncommitted or 
wavering voter.”5 To combat the resulting problems of “voter intimidation and fraud,” 
between about 1888 and 1896 virtually all of the states adopted the reform, first made 
popular in Australia, of requiring voters to use a ballot printed by the state.6 But that meant 
the states had to decide which candidates or parties would be listed on that ballot. That, 
in turn, led the states to take a greater role in overseeing and, ultimately, mandating the 
procedures that the parties use to select their nominees. 
 In most states, that state-mandated procedure became the party primary. In the 
South, the party primary was a device for evading the Fifteenth Amendment’s ban on 
racial discrimination in voting. As the primary was considered to be an internal party 
election, the Supreme Court held that a primary vote was not a “vote” within the meaning 
of the Constitution.7 In the North and West, by contrast, the primary was a progressive 
reform that provided a means of challenging party bosses’ control of the nomination 
process.8 When challenged in state courts, primary requirements were generally 
sustained as promoting party integrity, preventing “fraud or oppression,” and “increasing 
the power of the people to govern their parties.”9 The party primary also provided an 
opportunity for an actual competitive election in the many one-party states.10 Primaries 
were hailed as a mechanism for combatting the corrupt domination of party bosses and 
for vindicating the right to vote by extending it to the nomination process.11  
                                                          
5 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S, 191, 202 (1992). 
6 Id. at 200‒02.  
7 Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); cf. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921). States laws that 
mandated the exclusion of African-Americans from party primaries were held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 
See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). But when the exclusion resulted from a party rule, it was a matter of 
private activity, not state action. 
8 See, e.g., New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 205 (2008) (states “set their faces 
against ‘party bosses’ by requiring party-candidate selection through processes more favorable to insurgents, such as 
primaries”). 
9 See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Rebuilding the Right of Association: The Right to Hold a Convention as a Test Case, 11 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 191, 196‒200 (1982).  
10 See LEON D. EPSTEIN, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE AMERICAN MOLD 129‒30, 171 (1986).  As the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court observed in an 1886 decision, “[i]n many portions of the state, as is well known, a nomination by a 
convention of one of the parties is practically the equivalent of an election. In some instances, it is the precise 
equivalent.” Leonard v. Commonwealth, 4 A. 220, 225 (Pa. 1886). 
11 See Adam Winkler, Voters’ Rights and Parties’ Wrongs: Early Political Party Regulation in the State Courts, 
1886-1915, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (2000). 
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 State primary laws were often accompanied by other measures that required 
certain forms of party organization, structures, and procedures for the selection of both 
party officers and party nominees but that also typically guaranteed the leading parties 
placement on state ballots. The states came to treat the major parties as institutions akin 
to public utilities – they were powerful entities that dominated political competition and 
provided an essential public service in organizing the electoral process but also needed 
to be overseen and regulated in order to protect the “democratic legitimacy” of that 
process.12 
 The Supreme Court implicitly recognized this “public utility” model in 1941, in 
United States v. Classic,13 which disavowed the Court’s prior position that a party primary 
is simply the internal procedure of a private organization. Classic held that the federal law 
criminalizing fraud in elections to federal office applied to Louisiana’s congressional 
primary. As the Court explained, the primary “was conducted by the state at public 
expense,”14 and was “an integral part of the procedure” that Louisiana had chosen for the 
election of members of Congress.15 Indeed, “the practical influence of the choice of 
candidates at the primary may be so great as to affect profoundly the choice at the general 
election.”16 As a result, the Court in Classic held that Congress’s power under Article I, 
Section 4 of the Constitution to regulate the “times, places, and manner of holding 
elections” for members of Congress includes the power to regulate the party primaries 
that select the nominees who run in congressional elections.17  
 Three years later, in Smith v. Allwright,18 the Court observed that, due to Classic, 
“[i]t may now be taken as a postulate that the right to vote in . . . a primary for the 
nomination of candidates without discrimination by the State, like the right to vote in a 
general election, is a right secured by the Constitution.”19 Smith held that the Texas 
Democratic party could not exclude African-Americans from participating in its primary. 
                                                          
12 See EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 173‒74. 
13 313 U.S. 299 (1941). 
14 Id. at 311. 
15 Id. at 314. 
16 Id. at 319.  
17 Id. at 319‒21. 
18 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
19 Id. at 661‒62. 
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Although such exclusion was due to a party rule, and not a state law, it was still “state 
action,” so that the Constitution’s ban on racial discrimination in voting applied. Given the 
many state laws governing the internal structure of the party and the procedures for 
making party decisions, the party was “an agency of the state in so far as it determines 
the participants in a primary election.”20 Moreover, by making primaries “a part of the 
machinery for choosing officials, state and national” and “prescrib[ing] a general election 
ballot made up of party nominees . . . chosen” in primaries, the state had effectively 
“endorse[d], adopt[ed], and enforce[d]” the party’s racial discrimination.21 The Court 
concluded that although, as a matter of internal autonomy, the party could set its own 
rules for membership, when party membership became “the essential qualification for 
voting in a primary to select nominees for a general election, the state makes the action 
of the party the action of the state.”22   
 Nine years later, in Terry v. Adams,23 the Court held that the internal elections of 
a Texas county political association which were open only to the county’s white voters, 
and which, over a sixty-year period, effectively determined the winners of the Democratic 
primary and the general election, also constituted state action. There was no single 
opinion for the Court but the justices who composed the majority looked to the power of 
the party organization,24 the state’s acceptance and ratification of that power,25 and its de 
facto incorporation into the decision-making of the county Democratic Party. The party 
organization had become part of the “electoral apparatus” of the state, and, thus, was 
subject to the constitutional anti-discrimination requirements that apply to state action.26 
 Four decades later, in Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia,27 the Court held that 
the preclearance provision of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act – which required 
Department of Justice approval of any new “standard, practice or procedure with respect 
                                                          
20 Id. at 662‒63. 
21 Id. at 664. 
22 Id. at 664‒65. 
23 345 U.S. 461 (1953).  
24 Id. at 463‒70 (opinion of Justice Black, joined by Justices Douglas and Burton); id. at 484 (opinion of Justice 
Clark, joined by Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Jackson).  
25 Id. at 468‒70. 
26 Id. at 484.  
27 517 U.S 186 (1996).  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3499733 
 7 
 
to voting” adopted by a “covered jurisdiction” – applied to the Virginia Republican Party’s 
decision to impose a registration fee on anyone who wanted to become a delegate to the 
party convention that was called to nominate a candidate for the United States Senate.28 
Although there was no majority opinion for the Court, the two opinions that together made 
a majority relied on Smith and Terry in concluding that the party exercises a power 
delegated to it by the state when it chooses a nominee who will later appear, pursuant to 
state law, on the state’s general election ballot. As a result, when the state places the 
candidate chosen by the convention on the ballot, “it ‘endorses, adopts and enforces’ the 
delegate qualifications set by the party.”29  
B. First Amendment Protection of the Party Nomination Process 
 Starting In the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court began to voice a new theme 
in its treatment of the political parties by emphasizing that parties are political associations 
that enjoy the freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amendment. Moreover, the 
selection of a party’s general-election nominees was deemed to be at the core of the 
party’s First Amendment rights. 
 In Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,30 the Court held that the 
Connecticut law requiring that a party choose its nominees in a closed primary – that is, 
one limited to party members – unconstitutionally burdened the First Amendment rights 
of a party that wanted to open its primary to independent voters, that is, voters not 
registered with any party. The state law, the Court determined, “place[d] limits upon the 
group of registered voters whom the Party may invite to participate in the ‘basic function’ 
of selecting the Party’s candidates.”31 The state’s action “thus limit[ed] the Party’s 
associational opportunities at the crucial juncture at which the appeal to common 
principles may be translated into concerted action, and hence to political power in the 
                                                          
28 At the time Morse was decided, Virginia was a “covered jurisdiction,” subject to the preclearance requirement of 
the Voting Rights Act.  Two decades later, the Court struck down the provision of the Voting Rights Act setting the 
formula for the determination of covered jurisdictions, thus effectively terminating the preclearance requirement. 
See Shelby Co. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
29 Morse, 517 U.S. at 197‒200 (opinion of Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg). See also id. at 235, 239 
(opinion of Justice Breyer, joined by Justices O’Connor and Souter, citing Smith as authority for application of 
Voting Rights Act to party nomination processes). See also id. at 212-18, 236-40 (citing Terry). 
30 479 U.S. 208 (1986).  
31 Id. at 216. 
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community.”32 The Court subjected the imposition of the closed primary requirement to 
strict judicial scrutiny, and concluded that it was not narrowly tailored to promoting a 
compelling state interest. The Court found one of the justifications the state offered – 
ensuring the administrability of the primary system – was not compelling, while the others 
-- avoiding voter confusion, and protecting the responsibility of party government – were 
not advanced by the closed primary requirement.33  
 In Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee,34 the Court struck 
down a law that barred the governing bodies of political parties from endorsing candidates 
in party primaries. The endorsement ban sought to reduce the role that the party 
organization had over the selection of party nominees, and it reflected the same goal that 
was the impetus behind forcing parties to hold primaries. But the Court nonetheless found 
that the ban interfered with the ability of the party to “select a ‘standard bearer who best 
represents the party’s ideologies and preferences.’”35  
 And in California Democratic Party v. Jones,36 the Court invalidated California’s 
blanket primary law, adopted by voter initiative, which would have allowed each voter to 
vote in any party’s primary for each office on the ballot, including different party primaries 
for different offices (e.g., a voter could potentially vote in the Democratic primary for 
governor but in the Republican primary for attorney general). The Court reiterated that 
“states have a major role to play in structuring and monitoring the election process, 
including primaries,”37 but emphasized that “the processes by which political parties select 
their nominees” are not “wholly public affairs that the state may regulate freely.” Rather, 
the First Amendment “reserves” a “special place” and accords “special protection” to “the 
process by which a political party ‘select[s] a standard bearer who best represents the 
party’s ideologies and preferences.’”38 The blanket primary severely burdened party First 
Amendment rights by allowing those who “at best, have refused to affiliate with the party, 
                                                          
32 Id. (emphasis added). 
33 Id. at 217‒24. 
34 489 U.S. 214 (1989). 
35 Id. at 224.  
36 530 U.S. 567 (2000).  
37 Id. at 572. 
38 Id. at 572‒75.  
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and, at worst, have expressly affiliated with a rival” to participate in the party’s nomination 
process.39 That could change both the identity of a party’s nominee and the policy 
positions its candidates take, effectively “adulterat[ing]” the party’s candidate selection 
process. “We can think of no heavier burden on a political party’s associational freedom,” 
the Court wrote. It then determined that the principal justifications advanced for the 
blanket primary – making party nominees more representative of the general electorate 
and allowing otherwise “disenfranchised voters” to participate in the primary process – 
were not compelling.40 Indeed, these justifications were actually inconsistent with the 
rights of parties and party members to select their own nominees. Other justifications – 
such as that the blanket primary would be “fairer” to nonparty members in districts 
effectively controlled by one party, and that the blanket primary protected political privacy 
by enabling voters to participate in a primary without having to formally declare affiliation 
with a party – were dismissed as either non-compelling or capable of being satisfied by a 
less burdensome mechanism than the blanket primary.41  
 The Court in Jones stressed that its concern was with the state’s opening the 
party’s nomination process to non-party members. The state could still structure the ballot 
to facilitate participation by non-party voters in the selection of general-election 
candidates by creating a nonpartisan -- or “top two” -- primary in which all candidates for 
an office run on the same ballot regardless of party affiliation, and all voters can vote in 
that election, with the top two vote-getters moving on to the general election.42 In such a 
primary, non-party voters would not actually be picking a party’s nominee, and the party 
would be free to use its own internal processes for endorsing its preferred candidate. 
Indeed, in 2010 California voters passed a ballot proposition creating such a top-two 
system for congressional and state-level elections.43 
C. An Uncertain Synthesis 
                                                          
39 Id. at 577.  
40 Id. at 579‒82. 
41 Id. at 582‒86. 
42 Id. at 585‒86. 
43 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 5.  
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 States have the constitutional power to regulate their elections, including elections 
for federal offices; to set the terms for the placement of parties and candidates on the 
state’s ballot; and, as a result, to regulate the process by which parties determine their 
nominees. States can also use this power to promote other goals, such as the integrity 
and stability of the political party system.44 Yet, the parties, as political associations, are 
protected by the First Amendment, and that protection extends to the party’s selection of 
its nominees to contest the general election. These two constitutional norms do not easily 
fit together. In recent years, the doctrinal pendulum, which had swung first towards 
treating the parties as subject to state regulation and then towards a recognition of parties 
as bearers of First Amendment rights, appears to be swinging at least moderately back 
towards affirming state regulatory authority.  
 In Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,45 the Court upheld Minnesota’s “anti-
fusion” law that prohibited a party from nominating a candidate who had been nominated 
by another party. A few years later, in Clingman v. Beaver,46 the Court rejected a party’s 
argument that a state’s semi-closed primary law, which permitted participation by party 
members and independent voters, but not voters registered with another party, violated 
the party’s First Amendment right to choose to open its primary fully to voters registered 
with other parties. In both cases, the unsuccessful plaintiff was a minor party, so the 
results may be chalked up to the Court’s preference for the two-party system47 and its 
implicit hostility to minor parties.48 But the Court’s mode of analysis was not limited to 
minor parties. Instead, in both cases, the Court applied the so-called Anderson-Burdick 
balancing test, which It developed to deal with challenges brought by candidates and 
voters to state election regulations.49 Anderson-Burdick reflects the judgment that “States 
may, and inevitably must, enact regulations of parties, elections, and ballots to reduce 
election- and campaign-related disorder,”50 even though those regulations will also 
                                                          
44 See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974). 
45 520 U.S. 351 (1997). 
46 544 U.S. 581 (2005). 
47 See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. at 367 (1997). 
48 See, e.g., Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).  
49 Anderson-Burdick derives from Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), in which an independent candidate 
sought a place on the general election ballot, and from Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992), which considered a 
voter’s claim to cast, and have counted, a write-in ballot in the state’s general election. 
50 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358. 
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inevitably burden First Amendment associational rights. When an election regulation is 
challenged, the Court will first assess the “character and magnitude” of the burden of the 
state’s rule. If the burden is severe, the law will have to be narrowly tailored to advancing 
a compelling state interest. But “[l]esser burdens . . . trigger less exacting review” and 
“‘important regulatory interests’ will usually be enough to justify ‘reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory restrictions.’”51  
 The preliminary determination of the magnitude of the burden of the state’s law on 
protected associational freedom is key. In both Timmons and Clingman, the Court found 
the burdens to be relatively modest. Timmons reasoned that in light of the general laws 
that limit the eligibility of candidates, a party does not have an absolute right to nominate 
any particular candidate it wants. Moreover, although the anti-fusion law barred the party 
from nominating its preferred candidate, it was still free to endorse and support him.52 
This certainly seems in tension with the Court’s prior decisions that had emphasized the 
vital importance of the party nominee as the “standard bearer who best represents the 
party’s ideologies and preferences.”53 In Clingman, four members of the Court’s majority 
did not find that the limit on the party’s right to open its primary to non-members was much 
of a burden on the associational rights of the party at all.54 The other two justices in the 
majority acknowledged that some “significant associational interests [were] at stake” but 
thought the burden imposed by a semi-closed primary was “modest and politically neutral” 
as it barred only those voters who had chosen to affiliate with another party from 
participating in the plaintiff party’s primary.55 Again, this is hard to square with Tashjian’s 
emphasis on the party’s interest in determining who can vote in its primary. Both Timmons 
and Clingman found the laws at issue were justified by the general state interests in the 
stability of the party system56 and in maintaining the integrity of political parties as “viable 
                                                          
51 Id.  
52 Id. at 359‒60.  
53 See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989). 
54 Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. at 587‒91 (plurality opinion of Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justices Scalia and Kennedy). 
55 Id. at 602‒04 (opinion of Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Breyer).  
56 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 366‒70. 
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and identifiable interest groups,”57 even when political parties actually opposed those 
notionally pro-party rules. 
 In Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party,58 the Court 
employed the Anderson-Burdick standard to assess a First Amendment challenge 
brought by a major party. In the aftermath of California Democratic Party v Jones, 
Washington voters adopted a top-two primary system, but that law allowed a candidate 
to indicate a “party preference” on the ballot.59 The state’s Republican Party sued, 
claiming that the “party preference” provision violated the party’s constitutional rights 
because voters would associate a candidate with the party of his or her stated party 
preference even for “a candidate who is unaffiliated with” the party “or even repugnant to” 
it.60 Stressing that the party was bringing only a facial challenge, the Court concluded that 
the party had failed to provide the evidence necessary to prove that the “party preference” 
provision would inevitably be a severe burden on its associational rights.61 As a result, 
the state only had to show that the party preference provision served an “important 
regulatory interest.” The Court agreed with the state that the interest in providing voters 
with information about the candidates on the ballot was such an interest.62 Washington 
Grange was less clearly at odds with the view that the First Amendment protects party 
control over the nomination process than Timmons or Clingman but all three decisions 
certainly reflect the Court’s continuing commitment to giving the states significant control 
over their primaries. 
 The strong statements in Tashjian, Eu, and Jones concerning the fundamental 
importance of the nomination process to party autonomy implicitly challenge the power of 
the states to mandate the use of a primary election to choose party nominees. In 
American Party of Texas v. White63 -- decided before the leading party autonomy cases 
-- the Court declared that “it is too plain for argument  . . . that the State . . . may insist 
                                                          
57 Clingman, 544 U.S. at 593‒94.  
58 552 U.S. 442 (2008). 
59 Id. at 444. 
60 Id. at 447. 
61 Id. at 454‒58. 
62 Id. at 458. 
63 415 U.S. 767 (1974). 
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that intraparty competition be settled before the general election by primary election or by 
party convention.”64 But the power to require a primary was not at issue in White, which 
concerned a Texas law that provided for different nomination processes for minor and 
new parties as opposed to the established major parties. The Court repeated American 
Party’s “too plain for argument” line in Jones65 and more recently in New York State Board 
of Elections v. Lopez Torres,66 although again a state’s power to mandate a primary was 
not at issue in either case.67 Indeed, the Court has never addressed a direct challenge to 
the constitutionality of the mandatory primary or explained how it squares with a party’s 
powerful First Amendment interest in deciding the selection of its nominees. Lopez 
Torres, which turned back a challenge to New York’s hybrid primary-and-convention 
system for selecting judicial candidates, gestured at a reason for the constitutionality of a 
primary requirement when it linked state regulation of the nomination process to the 
state’s decision to “give[] the party a role in the election process . . . by giving certain 
parties the right to have their candidates appear with party endorsement on the general-
election ballot.”68  But even then the Court noted that the state’s power was limited by the 
First Amendment, citing the trio of Tashjian, Eu, and Jones.69 
 The constitutionality of the primary requirement was implicated in two post-Jones 
federal court of appeals decisions. In Alaska Independence Party v. Alaska,70 two minor 
parties challenged the Alaska law allowing any voter registered with a party – and any 
voter could choose to register with any party -- to seek that party’s nomination. The parties 
expressed the concern that because they could not control who registers with them and 
thus who may run for their nominations, the primary law prevented them from excluding 
candidates they found objectionable. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
however, observed that the very purpose of the direct primary requirement is to shift 
control over the nomination process from “party leadership” to “rank-and-file party voters.” 
                                                          
64 Id. at 781. 
65 California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 657, 572 (2000). 
66 552 U.S. 196, 203 (2008). 
67 See also Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 486 U.S. 208, 237 (1986) (Scalia, J. dissenting, quoting and 
citing the line from American Party).  
68 Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. at 203. 
69 Id.  
70 545 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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As candidacy was limited to those who had chosen to affiliate with the party, and the party 
leadership remained free to endorse its preferred candidates and disavow undesired 
candidates, the court determined that the law’s burden on party autonomy was modest. 
Even if it could be considered severe, “the state’s interest in eliminating the fraud and 
corruption that frequently accompanied party-run nominating conventions is 
compelling.”71 
 In 2018, Utah Republican Party v. Cox72 vindicated a state’s authority, in the face 
of a First Amendment objection, to alter a party’s nomination process. Utah Republican 
Party rules provided for nominations by a convention composed of delegates elected at 
neighborhood caucuses. If a candidate won more than sixty percent of the convention 
vote, there would be no primary; if no candidate won sixty percent at the convention, there 
would be a primary limited to the two candidates who got the most convention votes. 
Utah’s Republican-controlled legislature, however, passed a new law enabling any 
candidate who collected a qualifying number of petition signatures from party voters to 
participate in the primary, whether or not that candidate had sought the nomination in the 
convention or had been one of the top two convention candidates.73  The Tenth Circuit 
rejected the state party organization’s claim that this state-directed change to the 
nomination process severely burdened its freedom of association. In the court’s view, the 
law was not an attack on party autonomy but a determination by the “overwhelmingly” 
Republican legislature of who actually spoke for the party – the relatively small group of 
activists who participate in the caucus-and-convention process, or the “roughly 600,000 
registered Republicans”74 eligible to participate in the primary. With the primary limited to 
party voters, the court’s majority saw little burden on associational rights,75 and concluded 
the law was justified by the state’s interests in increasing voter participation and access 
to the ballot.76 However, the dissent found that by superseding the party’s rules, the 
                                                          
71 Id. at 1179‒80. 
72 892 F.3d 1066 (10th Cir. 2018).  
73 The law actually authorized two types of parties – “registered parties” and “qualified parties.” All candidates for 
the nomination of a registered party would have to collect a certain number of signatures in order to qualify for 
placement on the primary ballot. Qualified parties – such as the Utah Republican Party – could also place their top 
convention candidates on the primary ballot without having to collect petition signatures. Id. 1072-73. 
74 Id. at 1082. 
75 Id. at 1081‒83. 
76 Id. at 1083‒85. 
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primary law necessarily interfered with party autonomy. The dissent also emphasized the 
tension between the mandatory primary and the Supreme Court’s recognition of party 
autonomy in cases like Jones,77 and contended that the “behemoth, corrupt party 
machines” invoked to justify mandatory primaries are a thing of the past. Indeed, the 
dissent urged the Supreme Court to directly address the constitutionality of the mandatory 
primary in light of the cases emphasizing party associational rights.78 The Supreme Court, 
however, denied certiorari.79 
 Assuming a mandatory primary is constitutional, open primaries, as fifteen states 
require for at least some elections,80 may be subject to challenge. Jones noted that an 
open primary “may be constitutionally distinct” from the invalidated blanket primary as 
“the voter is limited to one party’s ballot,” but Jones was also careful to say that it was not 
passing on the constitutionality of open primaries.81 Moreover, the same concern of 
compelling party members to associate with non-members in the nomination process that 
was at issue in Jones is surely implicated by the open primary, in which any registered 
voter is entitled to vote, regardless of the voter’s party affiliation. In the handful of 
challenges to open primary laws since Jones, the lower federal courts have generally 
been reluctant to find open primary laws facially unconstitutional,82 but several have left 
open the possibility of as-applied challenges, and at least two courts have sustained those 
challenges when the parties provided evidence that there was likely to be a sufficiently 
high level of “cross-over voting” – that is, voting by members of other parties – to affect 
the nomination.83 That would be a “severe burden” on the party’s freedom of association, 
not justified by any compelling state interest.  
                                                          
77 Id. at 1110‒11 (opinion of Tymkovich, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
78 Id. at 1072 (Tymkovich, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).  
79 Utah Republican Party v. Cox, 139 S. Ct. 1290 (2019). 
80 See State Primary Election Systems, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/Elections/Primary_Types_Table_2017.pdf. 
81 California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 657, 577 n.8 (2000); see also id. at 576 n.6. 
82 See, e.g., Ravalli Co. Republican Central Comm. v. McCulloch, 154 F.Supp.3d 1063 (D. Mont. 2015); 
Democratic Party of Hawaii v. Nago, 982 F.Supp.2d 1166 (D. Hawaii 2013); Greenville Co. Republican Party Exec. 
Comm. v. State, 824 F.Supp.2d 655 (D.S.C. 2011); Miller v. Brown, 503 F.3d 360, 368 (4th Cir. 2007); Arizona 
Libertarian Party v. Bayless, 351 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2003).  
83 See, e.g., Utah Republican Party v. Herbert, 144 F.Supp.3d 1263, 1270‒82 (D. Utah 2015); Idaho Republican 
Party v. Ysursa, 765 F.Supp.2d 1266 (D. Idaho 2011). 




 The constitutional tension between a state’s control of its elections and a party’s 
autonomy with respect to the selection of its nominees remains unresolved, at least in 
theory. In practice, the constitutionality of the mandatory primary seems settled. This may 
be due to the state’s power to make the automatic listing of party nominees on the general 
election ballot contingent on the party’s use of the primary to select its nominees. It may 
also reflect the sense that at least when the primary is limited to party voters, the state is 
not burdening freedom of association but protecting the rights of association members to 
be heard. The tension becomes sharper when the state requires the party to allow non-
party members to participate in the primary process over the party’s objection. There have 
been relatively few cases dealing with this issue, perhaps because the parties -- or at 
least the major parties – are likely to have considerable influence with their state 
legislatures, so that laws the party organizations oppose will not often be enacted, 
although the recent Utah dispute is a clear counterexample. In the few cases that have 
arisen, courts have first looked to the states’ power to structure their elections, including 
the regulation of party nominations, and have placed the burden on the challengers to 
prove that the state-determined voting rule severely infringes their associational rights. In 
a handful of cases, parties have been able to carry that burden, and it is possible that 
there will be more challenges in the future. 
III. The Constitutional Status of National Party Rules and Conventions 
 Although the balance of constitutional power between government and party with 
respect to party nominations remains uncertain in state-level elections, in a trio of cases 
decided between 1972 and 1981, the Supreme Court made it clear that when it comes to 
the presidential nomination process, national party rules and the decisions of national 
party conventions take precedence over the rules and decisions of state-level actors. 
These decisions swept aside the nascent tendency, evidenced most clearly in a pair of 
decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 
1971, to extend the Smith/Terry treatment of the party nomination process as state action 
to the national conventions. Those D.C. Circuit decisions involved challenges, brought 
under the “one person, one vote” doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3499733 
 17 
 
Protection Clause, to how the national parties allocated delegates across the states to 
the 1972 national conventions.  Although the D.C. Circuit panels ultimately concluded the 
parties had not violated “one person, one vote,” both cases agreed that a decision made 
by parties at the national level “is tantamount to a decision of the States acting in concert 
and therefore subject to constitutional standards applicable to state action,” and that 
“there is no doubt that the allocation  among the States of delegates to a party national 
convention is subject to the equal protection requirements of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”84 
 Beginning in 1972, however, the Supreme Court determined that the state 
action/public utility model does not apply to the national conventions and national party 
rules. In O’Brien v. Brown,85 the Court addressed two controversies concerning the 
seating of competing delegations to the 1972 Democratic National Convention. The 
Illinois delegation had been elected in violation of guidelines adopted by the Democratic 
National Committee the year before, while the California delegation was entirely pledged 
to the winner of that state’s winner-take-all primary, in violation of the mandate of the 1968 
Democratic National Convention calling for the elimination of winner-take-all rules. The 
Convention’s Credentials Committee had recommended unseating the Illinois delegation 
and 151 of the 271 California delegates. Suits were brought challenging both decisions. 
The D.C. Circuit sustained the district court’s dismissal of the claim brought by the Illinois 
delegation, but reversed the district court’s dismissal of the California claim, and petitions 
for certiorari and requests for stays were filed with the Supreme Court in both cases.  
 Acting on the very eve of the Convention, the Supreme Court stayed the judgments 
of the court of appeals. In a brief opinion, the Court underscored the status of “our national 
political parties . . . as voluntary associations of individuals,” and noted that whether there 
was either state action or a justiciable issue was uncertain “in this unique context.” The 
Court cautioned against the judiciary acting “to interject itself into the deliberative 
processes of a national political convention.” Instead, it found the “convention itself . . . 
                                                          
84 Bode v. National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1032, 1304‒05 (D.C. 1971); accord, Georgia v. National 
Democratic Party, 447 F.2d 1271, 1274‒78 (D.C. Cir. 1971).   
85 409 U.S. 1 (1972).  
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the proper forum for determining intra-party disputes as to which delegates shall be 
seated.”86  
 The Illinois delegation’s dispute was back before the Court more than two years 
later in Cousins v. Wigoda,87 which grew out of the Illinois state court litigation between 
the delegates who had won election in the March 1972 Illinois Democratic primary (“the 
Wigoda delegates”) and the alternative delegation (“the Cousins delegates”) who had 
argued that the procedures used to elect the Wigoda delegation violated the national 
party’s guidelines. The Wigoda delegates won a state court order enjoining the Cousins 
group from serving as delegates at the Convention. Nonetheless, the Convention voted 
to seat the Cousins delegation. An Illinois appellate court subsequently affirmed the 
injunction previously issued by the state court, finding that the election of convention 
delegates was “governed by non-discriminatory state legislation” which reflected the 
“interest of the state in protecting the effective right to participate in primaries” and, thus, 
took “primacy . . . over the decisions of a national political party convention.”88 The 
Supreme Court reversed in an opinion which emphasized the special nature of a 
presidential nomination as a nation-level decision. 
 The Court acknowledged that Illinois has “a compelling interest in protecting the 
right of its electoral processes and the right of its citizens . . . to effective suffrage,” but 
pointed to “the significant fact that the suffrage was exercised at the primary election to 
elect delegates to a National Party Convention.” That necessarily reduced the weight of 
the state’s interest, as convention delegates “perform a task of supreme importance to 
every citizen of the Nation regardless of their State of residence.”89 The Court minimized 
the state’s stake in the selection of convention delegates, noting “[t]he States themselves 
have no constitutionally mandated role in the great task of the selection of Presidential 
and Vice-Presidential candidates,” and then expressed the concern that requiring 
deference to state law left open the possibility of each state establishing its own 
qualifications without regard to party policy, “an obviously intolerable result.” Instead, the 
                                                          
86 Id. at 4. 
87 419 U.S. 477 (1975). 
88 Wigoda v. Cousins, 302 N.E.2d 614, 627 (Ill. App. 1973). 
89 Wigoda, 419 U.S. at 489. 
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matter ought to be left to the Convention, “which serves the pervasive national interest in 
the selection of candidates for national office, and this national interest is greater than 
any interest of an individual State.”90 
 A third Supreme Court decision confirmed the primacy of national party decisions 
over state law and state parties with respect to the presidential nomination process. The 
national Democratic Party’s rules for the selection of delegates to the 1980 National 
Convention provided that participation in the delegate selection process must be limited 
to registered Democrats. Since 1903, however, Wisconsin’s election law had provided for 
state primaries to be open to all registered voters, and the state – including the state 
Democratic Party – was unwilling to change this law. The state attorney general (a 
Democrat) sued the Democratic National Committee on behalf of the state, seeking a 
declaration that the national Democrats could not refuse to seat a Wisconsin delegation 
elected through an open primary. The Wisconsin Democratic Party, although technically 
also a defendant, also sued the national party for an order requiring the national party to 
recognize the delegates selected according to Wisconsin law. The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court entered a judgment for the state and the state party.  
 In Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel LaFollette,91 the 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that “a State, or a court, may not constitutionally 
substitute its own judgment for that of the Party. A political party’s choice among the 
various ways of determining the makeup of a State’s delegation to the party’s national 
convention is protected by the Constitution.”92 Wisconsin had a “substantial interest in the 
manner in which its elections are conducted”93 and was free to hold an open primary, but 
it could not compel the national party to seat a delegation selected by a procedure that 
violated national party rules, nor could it compel Wisconsin delegates to vote according 
to the results of the state primary if that would violate party rules.94 
                                                          
90 Id. at 489‒90. 
91 450 U.S. 107 (1981). While the case was pending, the Supreme Court stayed the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s 
order, thus allowing the national party not to seat the Wisconsin delegates, but the Convention chose to seat the 
delegates. Id. at 114‒15. 
92 Id. at 123‒24. 
93 Id. at 126.  
94 Id.  
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 LaFollette was the last time the Supreme Court addressed the constitutional status 
of national party rules and national nominating conventions, and the message of O’Brien, 
Cousins and LaFollette taken together is clear. National political parties are unique 
entities, not analogous to the state actors in White and Terry, and their rules and decisions 
take precedence over conflicting state laws, state party preferences, and state court 
decisions. The doctrine resulting from these cases is so well-defined that there have been 
few significant cases dealing with national conventions or national parties since 
LaFollette. Indeed, immediately following Cousins, the D.C. Circuit reconsidered its 
approach to the convention delegate allocation question, concluding that the “one person, 
one vote” doctrine did not apply to the parties at all and “reserving” the question of state 
action.95 Subsequently, an Eleventh Circuit panel, relying on LaFollette, dismissed as 
nonjusticiable a challenge to a Florida Republican Party rule, adopted pursuant to a 
national party directive concerning the apportionment of delegates within the state,96 and 
the Fourth Circuit rejected a challenge to a 1984 Democratic National Committee rule 
requiring that state delegations to the national convention consist of equal numbers of 
men and women, observing in the course of its analysis that “the efforts of the states to 
regulate delegate selection have been consistently rebuffed.”97 
 In short, the national parties’ role in the presidential nomination process benefits 
from their status as private associations protected by the First Amendment, and even 
more so, at least relative to the states, as national actors engaged in a political process 
of national significance. 
IV. The Constitutional Question of a Role for Congress 
 One aspect of the current presidential nomination system that has frequently been 
criticized is the presidential primary timetable. The early dates of the first caucuses and 
primaries (a problem known as front-loading98); the privileged position of small, 
demographically unrepresentative states like Iowa and New Hampshire; and the 
                                                          
95 Ripon Society, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc).  
96 Wymbs v. Republican State Executive Comm. of Florida, 719 F.2d 1072 (11th Cir. 1983). 
97 Bachur v. National Democratic Party, 836 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1987).  
98 See, e.g., WILLIAM G. MAYER & ANDREW E. BUSCH, THE FRONT-LOADING PROBLEM IN PRESIDENTIAL 
NOMINATIONS (2003). 
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seemingly random and unstable nature of the caucus and primary schedules have led to 
calls for change. Possible reforms include a later start to the nomination calendar, rotating 
which states get to host the first contests, or regional primaries. Recognizing the difficulty 
of coordinating the laws of fifty states99 and the rules of the state and national parties, 
some observers have called for federal legislation to address the presidential nomination 
process while simultaneously also questioning whether Congress has the constitutional 
authority to enact legislation regulating presidential nominations.100 This is not just a 
matter of whether the parties’ First Amendment protection precludes congressional 
regulation, but also whether as a matter of federalism Congress has any authority in this 
area at all. 
 The source of the asserted federalism difficulty is the text of Article II, Section 1 of 
the Constitution (as amended by the Twelfth Amendment), which establishes the 
procedure for electing a president through the Electoral College, especially when 
contrasted with the provisions of Article I, Section 4, which deals with congressional 
elections. Article II provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the 
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors” equal to the number of its members 
of Congress; limits the eligibility of who can serve as a presidential elector; lays out the 
procedure for the Electoral College to vote, and, if the Electoral College fails to produce 
a majority winner, for the House of Representatives to pick a president. (The Twelfth 
Amendment modified the procedure to provide for the separate election of a president 
and vice president.) Congress is authorized to “determine the Time of chusing the 
Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same 
throughout the United States.” But other than this ability to set uniform days for the 
selection of Electors and for the Electors to vote, Congress is given no other power at all 
with respect to election of the Electoral College. Unless and until the Electoral College is 
                                                          
99 There are typically far more than fifty jurisdictional delegations to the presidential nomination conventions. There 
are regularly delegates from the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa and 
other overseas jurisdictions. The “fifty states” is merely convenient, if inaccurate, short-hand for the multiple 
subnational players involved in the process. 
100 See, e.g., MAYER & BUSCH, supra note 98, at 131‒39; ELAINE C. KAMARCK, PRIMARY POLITICS: EVERYTHING 
YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT HOW AMERICA NOMINATES ITS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES 183‒85 (2015).  
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unable to pick a majority winner, the presidential selection process established by the 
Constitution is very state-centered. 
 The argument for very limited Congressional authority with respect to presidential 
elections is bolstered by a comparison of Article II with the Constitution’s treatment of 
congressional elections. Although Article I, Section 4 begins by stating that “[t]he Times, 
Places and manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be 
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof” it then goes on to provide that “the 
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places 
of chusing Senators.” As the Supreme Court recently emphasized, the “substantive 
scope” of congressional power to regulate congressional elections is “broad.”101 Its 
“comprehensive words embrace authority to provide a complete code for congressional 
elections”102 and to supersede any inconsistent state law.103 As previously noted, United 
States v. Classic extended that broad power to include the regulation of congressional 
primaries. The absence of any such constitutional power for Congress to regulate the 
election of presidential electors is striking, however, and has been cited as the basis for 
doubting congressional authority to regulate the presidential nomination process.104 
 The textual silence of Article II, relative to Article I, notwithstanding, the Supreme 
Court has recognized Congress’s power to regulate presidential elections. In Burroughs 
v. United States,105 in 1932, the Court sustained the application of the campaign finance 
disclosure provisions of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 to a presidential 
campaign committee. As the Court explained,  
The President is vested with the executive power of the nation. The importance of 
his election and the vital character of its relationship to and effect upon the welfare 
and safety of the whole people cannot be too strongly stated. To say that Congress 
is without power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard such an election from 
the improper use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital 
particular the power of self-protection. Congress, undoubtedly, possesses that 
power, as it possesses every other power essential to preserve the departments 
                                                          
101 Arizona v. InterTribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 8 (2013).  
102 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932).  
103 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 392 (1880).  
104 See, e.g., MAYER & BUSCH, supra note 98. 
105 290 U.S. 534 (1934). 
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and institutions of the general government from impairment or destruction, whether 
threatened by force or corruption.106 
 
Citing Burroughs, the Supreme Court again “recognized broad Congressional power to 
regulate in connection with the elections of the President and Vice President” in Buckley 
v. Valeo,107 in which it generally upheld most of the contribution restrictions and disclosure 
requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act without distinguishing between the 
law’s application to congressional elections as opposed to presidential elections. 
Moreover, Buckley upheld the public funding provisions which dealt exclusively with 
presidential elections, including presidential primaries and the presidential nominating 
conventions.108 Indeed, federal campaign finance law,109 federal law dealing with fraud 
and misconduct in federal elections,110 and other federal voting related measures have 
all been applied by Congress to presidential elections. 
 The Supreme Court also invoked the unique national nature of the presidency and 
presidential elections when it invalidated Ohio’s early filing deadline for independent 
candidates in Anderson v. Celebrezze.111 As the Court noted, “in the context of a 
Presidential election, state-imposed restrictions implicate a uniquely important national 
interest. For the President and the Vice President of the United States are the only elected 
officials who represent all the voters in the Nation. . . . Similarly, the State has a less 
important interest in regulating Presidential elections than statewide or local elections, 
because the outcome of the former will be largely determined by voters beyond the State’s 
boundaries.”112 Although Anderson addressed only the limits on state regulatory power 
rather than the existence or scope of national regulatory power, its implication is that if 
                                                          
106 Id. at 545. 
107 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
108 See id. at 85‒109.  
109 On the consequences of federal campaign finance law for the ability of the national parties to sponsor debates 
among candidates for presidential nominations, see Bob Bauer, A Debatable Role in the Process: Political Parties 
and the Candidate Debates in the Presidential Nominating Process, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 589 (2018). 
110 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 594.  
111 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
112 Id. at 794‒95. 
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there is going to be regulation of presidential elections it should at least in part be national 
in scope. 
 The foundation for congressional regulation of the presidential nomination process 
is ultimately structural rather than any specific provision of constitutional text. As Justice 
Black once put it, “inherent in the very concept of a supreme national government with 
national officers is a residual power in Congress to insure that those officers represent 
their national constituency as responsively as possible. This power arises from the nature 
of our constitutional system of government and from the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.”113 Scholars have also found constitutional authority for congressional action in 
Congress’s power to count the electoral votes (combined with the Necessary and Proper 
Clause)114; the Times. Places, and Manner Clause that authorizes federal regulation of 
congressional elections, as presidential elections are often held at the same time and on 
the same ballots as congressional elections;115 and the Twelfth Amendment, which, it has 
been argued, implicitly recognizes the role of political parties in presidential elections.116 
 Congressional power to regulate presidential nominations also likely includes the 
power to impose obligations on the states. Although the Supreme Court’s anti-
commandeering doctrine bars Congress from directing state legislatures to pass laws or 
from requiring state and local officials to implement federal laws,117 several lower courts 
have held that the anti-commandeering principle does not apply to federal laws, such as 
the National Voter Registration Act, adopted pursuant to Congress’s Times, Places, and 
Manner power.118 Assuming, as the Supreme Court indicated in Burroughs and Buckley, 
                                                          
113 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124 n.7 (1970) (Justice Black, announcing the judgments of the Court in an 
opinion expressing his own view of the cases). See also Dan T. Coenen & Edward J. Larson, Congressional Power 
Over Presidential Elections:  Lessons from the Past and Reforms for the Future, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 851, 87-
909 (2002).  
114 Id. at 909-16. 
115 See id. at 916-20; Vikram David Amar, The Case for Reforming Presidential Elections by Sub-Constitutional 
Means: The Electoral College, the National Vote Compact and Congressional Power, 100 GEO. L.J. 237, 260 
(2011). 
116 See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Presidential Nomination Reform: Legal Restraints and Procedural Possibilities, in 
REFORMING THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION PROCESS 181-82 (Melanie J. Springer & Steven S. Smith eds., 2009). 
117 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) 
118 See, e.g., Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (“ACORN”) v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833 (6th 
Cir. 1997); ACORN v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 1995); Voting Rights Coalition v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411 (9th 
Cir. 1995).  
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that congressional power to regulate presidential elections is comparable to its power to 
regulate federal elections generally, the anti-commandeering doctrine ought not apply. 
 Congress, thus, ought to have as much power to regulate the presidential 
nomination process as it has to regulate federal elections generally. The real constraint 
on Congress, then, is not federalism but the First Amendment. As Part II has indicated, 
the extent of that constraint is uncertain. The Supreme Court would likely apply the 
Anderson-Burdick test, with the nature of the judicial review turning on the severity of the 
legislative burden that congressional regulations would have on a political party’s freedom 
of association. As Part II has also shown, what counts as a severe burden – and what 
compelling interests might justify such a burden – is far from clear. It is tempting to 
speculate that some congressional regulation of the nomination process, such as 
changes to the timing and tempo of the nomination calendar, would not be seen as severe 
(especially if not opposed by the national parties) and could be justified by the 
“reasonable, nondiscriminatory” purpose of equalizing the influence of different states in 
the nomination process or giving candidates more time to bring their campaigns to more 
voters.119 Conversely, it seems likely that a federal effort to regulate the inner workings of 
a Convention, such as by strengthening (or weakening) the influence of super-delegates, 
would be seen as a severe burden as such a change would likely change the type of 
candidate who gets nominated. But given the paucity of cases, and the tensions built into 
the Supreme Court’s doctrine, these are necessarily speculative observations.  
V. Conclusion 
 As a recent Congressional Research Service study concluded, “[t]he presidential 
nominating process is the single most complicated feature of the nation’s electoral 
system, because it relies on national and state political party rules and practices, as well 
as aspects of federal and state election laws.”120 Political scientist Elaine Kamarck has 
also noted that “[n]o one is really in charge of the presidential nomination system; there 
                                                          
119 Accord Lowenstein, supra note 116, at 188-90; Richard L. Hasen, “Too Plain for Argument?” The Uncertain 
Congressional Power to Require Parties to Choose Presidential Nominees Through Direct and Equal Primaries, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. 2009, 2017‒19 (2008). 
120 Kevin J. Coleman, The Presidential Nominating Process and the National Party Conventions, 2016: Frequently 
Asked Questions, CONG. RES. SERV., at 9 (Dec. 30, 2015).  
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is no ‘decider.’”121 This chapter’s review of Supreme Court doctrine necessarily focused 
on the kinds of conflicts between participants in the process that generated contested 
cases, but the process is marked by cooperation and bargaining as least as much as it is 
by litigated conflict.122 The national parties may make exceptions to their rules to 
accommodate recalcitrant states and state parties,123 and states and state parties may 
change their practices in light of national party guidelines. 
 Moreover, although the lack of a single “decider” may complicate efforts to change 
the nomination process, changes to the process do occur on an ongoing basis. Although 
there has been no national solution to the front-loading problem, both national parties 
now provide incentives to their state parties to move back their delegate selection events. 
The national Democratic Party offers states that hold their primaries or caucuses later in 
the nomination process a 15-20% increase in delegates,124 while the national Republican 
Party allows states that hold later nomination contests to allocate delegates on a winner-
take-all basis rather than the proportional representation rule required for states that go 
earlier in the process.125 This appears to have had some effect. The peak year for front-
loading was 2008, and since then we have seen the caucus and primary calendar moved 
back a bit. Similarly, to promote “regional” primaries, which may reduce candidate costs 
and better focus voter attention, the Democratic party offers states that hold their delegate 
selection events on the same day as two other neighboring states a “cluster” bonus of 
15% more delegates.126  
 Following the sharp criticisms voiced concerning the caucus system, particularly 
the low rate of participation in caucuses (relative to primaries) and the difficulties of access 
to the caucus process,127 the Democratic party changed its rules for the 2020 nomination 
to encourage greater use of primaries, and most of the caucus states have followed suit. 
As of the fall of 2019, at least ten of the fourteen states that held caucuses in 2016 have 
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announced they will select their delegates to the 2020 convention by a primary,128 so that 
the percentage of pledged delegates selected by caucus will drop from fourteen percent 
to less than five percent.129 These changes have also involved considerable innovation 
by state parties and cooperation between the state parties and state governments. For 
example, in four states – Alaska, Hawaii, Kansas, and North Dakota – the state 
Democratic Party will be holding party-run (or “firehouse”) primaries. These will be 
conducted by party officials, and they will involve balloting in places and at times chosen 
by the party. Some of these party-run primaries will provide for unusual balloting 
mechanisms including ranked choice voting and early voting.130  
Even the venerable Iowa caucus, although still a caucus, is being reformed by 
Iowa Democrats. The state party initially sought to expand participation by enabling 
Democrats to phone in absentee votes, rating their presidential preferences in a ranked 
choice style, with this virtual caucus taking place over six days. The Democratic National 
Committee ultimately vetoed the virtual caucus plan, concluding that it was too vulnerable 
to hacking.131 The state party then came up with a new plan, which the national party 
approved, to create multiple “satellite” caucuses – which could be held in workplaces, 
nursing homes, out-of-state college campuses, and even overseas community gathering 
places and elsewhere – in addition to the precinct caucuses to accommodate people who 
cannot attend the traditional in-precinct caucuses.132  
                                                          
128 See Geoffrey Skelley, How Will Democrats’ Move Away From Caucuses Affect the 2020 Race?, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 17, 2019), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-will-democrats-move-away-from-
caucuses-affect-the-2020-race/. 
129 See Nate Cohn, Fewer States Will Have Caucuses in 2020. Will it Matter?, N.Y. TIMES (April 12, 2019). 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/12/upshot/2020-election-fewer-caucuses-bernie.html. 
130 See Skelley, supra note 128; Kansas Democrats Settle on May Party-Run Primary, FRONTLOADING HQ (May 2, 
2019), http://frontloading.blogspot.com/2019/05/; Alaska Democrats Plan on April 4 Party-Run Primary, 
FRONTLOADING HQ (March 31, 2019), http://frontloading.blogspot.com/2019/03/; Hawaii Democrats Aim for an 
April Party-Run Primary in Lieu of Caucuses, FRONTLOADING HQ (March 26, 2019).  
131 See Brianne Pfannensteil & Barbara Rodriguez, DNC Recommends Scrapping Iowa’s Virtual Caucuses. Iowa 
Democratic Party Chair Insists Iowa Will Still Be First, DES MOINES REGISTER (Aug. 30, 2019), 
https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/elections/presidential/caucus/2019/08/30/iowa-caucus-dnc-reject-
virtual-plan-cyber-security-threat-2020-president-election-nevada-democratic/2163632001/.  
132 See  Brianne Pfannensteil, DNC Approves Iowa’s Plan to Hold ‘Satellite’ Caucuses in Nursing Homes, College 
Campuses, and More in 2020, DES MOINES REGISTER (Sept. 20, 2019), 
https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/elections/presidential/caucus/2019/09/20/dnc-approves-iowa-
caucuses-satellite-location-plan-2020-democrats-democratic-party/2387347001/ 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3499733 
 28 
 
On the Republican side, the state parties have also been changing their rules, 
albeit with the focus of not of expanding participation but of reducing the potential for 
opposition to the renomination of President Trump. Several state parties have eliminated 
the use of primaries or caucuses for selecting delegates or allocating them among 
candidates, or if the primary or caucus process is still used for choosing delegates among 
competing candidates raising the threshold of votes a candidate must receive in order to 
be allocated delegates, or by cancelling outright 133 
 Overall, what is most striking when examining the actions of the national and state 
parties and the state legislatures in preparing for the 2020 nominations is the degree of 
cooperation among the various actors in writing and rewriting the rules for the selection 
of convention delegates. New state-run primaries,134 changed primary dates,135 
authorization to cancel primaries,136 the creation of party-run primaries,137 and the 
expansion of participation in the caucus process in Iowa and Nevada,138 have all gone 
forward without major litigation. Although the course of changing the presidential 
nominating system is slow, messy, uneven, and uncertain, reforms do occur, even without 
a single “decider.” Indeed, the process provides room for state-level and state- and party-
specific innovations that reflect distinctive state and party preferences and also respond 
to and shape national trends. 
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 Unlike the presidential election process – with its entrenched Electoral College -- 
the Constitution itself imposes no constraints on changing the presidential nomination 
process. Moreover, the multiple potential actors empowered by constitutional law to 
address the nomination process provide multiple avenues for seeking change. The real 
obstacles to reforming the process are not constitutional but normative and political – 
deciding what would be a better process, and figuring out how to work the political system 
to get such a process adopted.  
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